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ESSAYS
INTER PARTES PATENT REEXAMINATION
Mark D. Janis*
INTRODUCTION
Inter partes reexamination has arrived in U.S. patent law at a
propitious moment, it might seem. The U.S. patent system is en-
during a time of genuine volatility as the United States Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") teaches itself how to deal with the on-
slaught of patent applications relating to electronic commerce.'
While the PTO struggles to get about the business of examining
"business method" patents,2 popular press allegations3 of systemic
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law.
1. For recent statistics on software patents, see, e.g., Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Y2K
Patent Fortune Pending?: Holding Rights to a Common Fix, Bruce Dickens is Sending
the Bill, WASH. POST., Dec. 17, 1999, at E01 (citing PTO statistics which show that the
number of software patent applications has doubled in the past fiscal year and the number
of issued software patents has quintupled since 1996).
2. I use the label "business method patents" advisedly. It is probably unfortunate
that the label has persisted in use despite the corresponding "business method" doctrine
having been laid definitively to rest. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin.
Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
3. For a sampling of recent reports on litigation involving e-commerce patents, see,
e.g., David Moschella, U.S. Patent Law Puts the Web Economy at Risk,
COMPuTERWORLD, Nov. 8, 1999, at 31 (opining that "appropriate government policy is so
clear and obvious: Software should be subject only to copyright, not patent, laws");
Gordon Black, Would-Be Web Giants go a Little Patent-Happy, SEATrLE TIMES, Nov. 7,
1999, at Fl (reporting on the Amazon.com and Priceline lawsuits) For a less alarmist
view, see Mike France, Why We Don't Need Patent Reform-Yet, Bus. WK., Dec. 20,
1999, at 54 (pointing to the patent system's ability to correct itself through, e.g., judicious
application of the obviousness criterion).
The facts and analysis in some articles of this variety are suspect, but they reveal im-
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errors in the issuance of patents in these new areas may fuel the
perception that Congress or the courts (or both) must swiftly take
corrective action. Indeed, it is at least conceivable that the over-
heated rhetoric directed against so-called "business method" pat-
ents, if left unaddressed, might threaten to grow into a more gen-
eral and serious indictment of the presumption of validity.4
It might seem, then, that Congress' passage of patent law re-
form legislation' is a matter of great serendipity. The legislation
package includes proposals that seek to reform the existing patent
reexamination system6 by expanding the opportunities for members
of the public to challenge the validity of issued patents in an ad-
ministrative setting.7 Politicians and optimists would no doubt de-
clare that just in time to handle the first wave of allegedly dubious
"business method" patents, Congress has finally refurbished the
administrative mechanism that facilitates public challenges to du-
bious patents post-grant.8 It does indeed seem likely that those
who perceive some threat from specific business method patents
portant perceptions that deserve close attention from the intellectual property community.
4. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994).
5. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 311-318 (1999)).
6. Prior to the reforms, the patent reexamination system was defined by the provi-
sions in 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (1994). For a study of the patent reexamination process,
see Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revoca-
tion System for U.S. Patent Law, I1 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1997) (examining legislative
proposals for reexamination reform and proposing an alternative approach drawing from
other administrative interpartes proceedings existing domestically and abroad).
7. The new provisions are codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-318. The new legislation
applies "to any patent that issues from an original application filed in the United States on
or after" the date of enactment which is Nov. 29, 1999. Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4608(a);
See also Legislation: Signing of IP Reforms Amends Work-for-Hire, Leaves 'First In-
ventor Defense' Unclear, 59 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 330 (BNA) (Dec. 2,
1999) (reporting the Nov. 29, 1999 signing of Pub. L. No. 106-113).
8. Congress also created a pre-grant publication scheme for U.S. patent applications,
Pub. L. No. 106-113, Subtitle E ("Domestic Publication of Patent Applications Published
Abroad"), which could have opened the door to pre-grant inter partes opposition pro-
ceedings. However, § 4502, Pub. L. No. 106-113 amends 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1994) to
specify, in a new § 122(c), that the PTO shall "establish appropriate procedures to ensure
that no protest or other form of pre-issuance opposition to the grant of a patent on an ap-
plication may be initiated after publication of the application without the express written
consent of the applicant." It will be interesting to see whether the PTO promulgates
regulations to handle pre-grant oppositions in the highly unlikely event that a patent
owner does consent to them.
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will consider the possibility of employing the new reexamination
procedures to rectify purported PTO blunders.9
Unfortunately, the new inter partes reexamination system will
not provide a particularly efficacious outlet for airing validity dis-
putes over business method patents, or any other patents for that
matter. Congress has let slip away a fine opportunity to demon-
strate the value of administrative revocation alternatives to patent
validity litigation. Instead, it has enacted a mongrel procedure that
is incoherent in its vision and unbalanced in its incentives struc-
ture.
In this essay, I analyze and comment critically on the new inter
partes reexamination legislation. Further, I renew my earlier call"'
for more fundamental legislative changes that would create a true
inter partes administrative revocation scheme.
I. OvERvIEw: Ex PARTE VS. INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION
The overall structure of the new reexamination legislation dif-
fers significantly from prior proposals, although a number of the
individual provisions that appeared in prior proposals do appear in
the new legislation. While most, if not all, of the reexamination
reform proposals would have made significant amendments to the
reexamination provisions codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307," Con-
gress changed its course late in the reform process, leaving §§ 301-
307 unchanged (except to rename it "ex parte" reexamination), and
engrafting a new Chapter 31, §§ 311-318, under the heading "Op-
tional Inter Partes Reexamination Procedures.""2 Perhaps this bi-
9. For a recent example of the use of the ex parte reexamination procedures to re-
view the validity of a software patent, see Patents: Patent and Trademark Office Orders
Reexamination of Y2K Fix Software Patent, PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT DAILY
(BNA) (Dec. 23, 1999).
10. See Janis, supra note 6, at 93-122 (proposing an administrative revocation sys-
tem, that looks for lessons from U.S. trademark inter partes proceedings and EPO post-
grant opposition proceedings).
11. See, e.g., Omnibus Patent Act of 1997, S. 507, 105" Cong., (1997) (enacted);
21' Century Patent System Improvement Act, H.R. 400, 105" Cong., 143 CONG. REC.
H152 (1997) (enacted) [hereinafter "H.R. 400 (1997)"]. For citations to reexamination
reform bills dating back to 1992, see Janis, supra note 6, at n. 3.
12. See 35 U.S.C §§ 301-307
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furcated structure was intended to give inter partes reexamination
a sufficiently temporary feel to make it more politically palatable.
Perhaps the bifurcation will prove beneficial when Congress
evaluates the performance of the reexamination system. 3 In any
event, the bifurcated structure seems a bit jury-rigged and may
prove complex and frustrating to users, and to the PTO as it works
to promulgate new regulations and relevant sections of the Manual
of Patent Examining Procedure ("MPEP").
In view of the bifurcated structure, anyone choosing to initiate
a reexamination will need initially to choose whether to request an
ex parte or new inter partes reexamination. While it might seem
intuitively obvious that third parties would request inter partes re-
examination and patent owners would request ex parte reexamina-
tion, the statute does not mandate this choice. Thus, while it seems
unlikely, third parties could still choose to initiate an ex parte reex-
amination, 14 and a patent owner could choose to initiate an "inter
partes" reexamination." Nevertheless, it seems likely that the ex
parte provisions will become almost exclusively the domain of
patent owner-initiated reexaminations,16 and the inter partes provi-
sions will become almost exclusively the domain of third-party
initiated reexaminations.1
7
13. See Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4606. The provision requires the PTO to report to
Congress within five years after the enactment of Pub. L. No. 106-113 on "whether the
inter partes reexamination proceedings established under the amendments made by this
subtitle are inequitable to any of the parties in interest. .. " If inequity is found, the PTO
report must recommend legislative changes. Id.
14. Third-party requesters faced with this choice would need to balance several
competing concerns, principally the enhanced opportunity to participate in inter partes
reexamination against the overreaching estoppel effects. Regarding the enhanced op-
portunity for third parties to participate in inter partes reexamination on the merits, see
infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text. For the accompanying estoppel effects, see
infra notes 44-66 and accompanying text.
15. See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (a) (1999) (specifying without limitation that "[a]ny person"
may file a request for inter partes reexamination). The prospect of a patent owner-
initiated "inter partes" reexamination seems especially bizarre.
16. Presumably the Commissioner will still choose to initiate ex parte reexamina-,
tions as the occasion warrants.
17. Thus, while the new chapter headings may imply that inter partes reexamination
is merely an optional adjunct to the existing ex parte regime, actual practice seems un-
likely to follow this pattern. Indeed, it seems quite possible that the ex parte provisions'
will be used very rarely.
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Of course, any bifurcated regime is subject to potential compli-
cations involving concurrent or serial proceedings involving the
same patent. For example, it seems likely that any patent owner-
initiated ex parte reexamination might well be followed by a third-
party-initiated inter partes reexamination. The PTO will presuma-
bly need to develop regulations that consolidate the proceedings as
a single inter partes proceeding."
Another example involves serial reexaminations on the same
patent, a practice which led to some criticism under the original re-
examination system when third parties could successively file re-
quests for reexamination during or after the initiation of any given
reexamination. While the new inter partes legislation contains an
estoppel provision against successive inter partes reexaminations,1 9
the estoppel provision does not appear to reach, for example, an
inter partes reexamination followed by one or more ex parte reex-
aminations.) It seems unlikely that Congress intended this result,
and, if Congress did, it is difficult to discern what policy objective
is being advanced.
II. THE FRONT END OF INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION
Parties who choose to pursue inter partes reexamination under
new provisions §§ 311-318 will encounter a number of familiar
problems and a host of new ones. In particular, inter partes reex-
amination requesters will find that the familiar problems com-
mence at the initial stage of the process, the request stage. The
new inter partes reexamination system is, quite unfortunately, bur-
dened with the same front end that so thoroughly compromised the
effectiveness of the original procedures.
First, the inter partes reexamination provisions retain the re-
18. This is not entirely a new phenomenon, given that it was possible under the ex-
isting provisions that a patent owner might initiate ex parte reexamination and a third-
party subsequently initiate another ex parte reexamination. For relevant regulations
dealing with this problem, see 37 C.F.R. § 1.565(c) (1998). ("If reexamination is ordered
while a prior reexamination proceeding is pending, the reexamination proceedings will be
consolidated and result in the issuance of a single certificate under § 1.570.")
19. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of these provi-
sions.
20. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
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striction of reexamination to documentary prior art.2 This well-
intentioned feature was one of several that were designed collec-
tively to restrict reexamination to a relatively stripped-down, fast,
low-cost proceeding, thereby limiting the potential for it to be used
as a harassment tool against patentees.22 However, as the raison
d'etre for reexamination gradually shifts focus from error correc-
tion to litigation avoidance,23 limiting reexamination to documen-
21. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (1999) ("Any person at any time may file a request for
inter partes reexamination by the Office of a patent on the basis of any prior art cited un-
der the provisions of § 301"); cf. 35 U.S.C. §302 (1994), the analogous provision in the
original reexamination scheme, specifying that reexamination requests may be based only
on "prior art cited under section 301." Section 301, in turn, provides that "[any person at
any time may cite to the Office in writing prior art consisting of patents or printed publi-
cations which that person believes to have a bearing on the patentability of any claim of a
particular patent." (emphasis supplied).
These provisions technically only extend to the reexamination request. If the request
generates an order for reexamination on the merits, reexamination is to be "conducted
according to the procedures established for initial examination," whether the reexamina-
tion is ex parte or inter partes. 35 U.S.C. § 305 (1994) (conduct of ex parte reexamina-
tion proceedings); cf 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (1999) (conduct of inter partes reexamination
proceedings). In the ex parte context, the courts and the PTO have interpreted this lan-
guage as restricting reexamination on the merits to documentary prior art, with modest
exceptions. See Janis, supra note 6, at 53 (noting that in addition to issues of validity
over documentary prior art, the PTO will also consider double patenting issues, and, for
new or amended claims, definiteness issues). Nothing in the text or legislative history of
the new legislation suggests that inter partes reexamination on the merits will have a sub-
stantive scope different from ex parte reexamination.
22. See Janis, supra note 6, at 45-6, 55-6 (discussing the anti-harassment rationale).
23. By "error correction" in this context, I mean to refer to a "curative" model for
reexamination, one that emphasizes the goal of allowing the PTO to correct its own errors
in a proceeding that seeks an initial showing of error but otherwise roughly mimics a
fresh ex parte examination. See Janis, supra note 6, at 19-26 (explaining the "curative"
model of reexamination and citing relevant authority). A clear statement of the curative
rationale for reexamination can be found, for example, in Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff,
758 F.2d 594, 601 (Fed. Cir. 1985), which states "Congress had an important public pur-
pose in mind when it enacted the reexamination statute. The statute was part of a larger
effort to revive United States industry's competitive vitality by restoring confidence in
the validity of patents issued by the PTO."
By a "litigation avoidance" model, I mean to refer to a model for reexamination that
emphasizes a much broader goal-channeling validity disputes away from the courts al-
together. A patent revocation system based on this model would presumably mimic and
improve on validity litigation in court; there would be no need to make such a system
look like original examination. The litigation avoidance rationale is most often cited in
current Congressional pronouncements about reexamination. See, e.g., Intellectual Prop-
erty and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, 107 ' Cong., 145 CONG. REC.
S14708 (1999) (section-by-section analysis of the Senate-passed bill that gave rise,,to
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tary prior art has become increasingly incongruous conceptually.
There can be little doubt that by excluding invalidity theories such
as compliance with the on sale and public use bars,24 Congress has
practically guaranteed that even inter partes reexamination will
never serve as a fully effective alternative to validity litigation,
notwithstanding Congressional pronouncements to the contrary.
When Congress revisits the reexamination system, its first priority
should be to broaden the substantive scope of reexamination to al-
low all prior art theories to be raised in reexamination.'-
Second, the threshold standard of the "substantial new question
of patentability" has likewise been carried over unchanged from
the original reexamination provisions.26 This standard is conceptu-
ally inconsistent with the new model for reexamination as a litiga-
tion alternative. Moreover, formulating rules for determining
when a question of patentability is both "substantial ' 28 and "new"
Pub. L. No. 106-113):
Subtitle F is intended to reduce expensive patent litigation in U.S. district
courts by giving third-party requesters, in addition to the existing ex parte reex-
amination in Chapter 30 of title 35, the option of inter partes reexamination
proceedings in the USPTO. Numerous witnesses have suggested that the vol-
ume of lawsuits in district courts will be reduced if third parties can be encour-
aged to use reexamination by giving them an opportunity to argue their case for
patent invalidity in the USPTO.
See also Janis, supra note 6, at 36-42 (analyzing the implications of the litigation
avoidance model for reexamination).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
25. Congress should also examine whether to open reexamination to other issues,
such as adequacy of disclosure issues under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994), first paragraph. An
.earlier version of the proposed legislation would have opened reexamination to all 35
U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph issues except best mode, see, e.g., The 21" Century Patent
System Improvement Act, H.R.400, 105'h Cong., 143 Cong. Rec. E76 (1997), proposed
-§§ 503(a),(b), [hereinafter "H.R 400 (1997)"], but this proposal does not appear in the
inter partes reexamination provisions passed by Congress.
26. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1994) (original reexamination provisions) with 35
U.S.C. § 312(a) (1999) (new inter partes reexamination provisions carrying forward the
"substantial new question of patentability" standard).
21 27. The standard was conceived as an anti-harassment measure, but also clearly ties
into the concept of reexamination as a curative mechanism for PTO errors. Under that
vision, it might make sense conceptually to insist on a threshold showing of a probable
-new and significant error to obtain jurisdiction. Under a vision of reexamination as an
alternative to litigation, the standard is not conceptually necessary.
I - 28. The PTO has insisted that a "substantial" question of patentability in the reex-
amination context is to be distinguished from a primafacie case of patentability. Instead,
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has proven so difficult as to cast into doubt any benefit that might
accrue from the threshold standard. The latter question, newness,
has already amply demonstrated a tendency for giving rise to
counterproductive ancillary litigation in Recreative Technologies
and its progeny. 9 The "substantial new question" requirement
should have been eliminated from inter partes reexamination, and
one can only hope that Congress will rethink the matter during a
future round of reexamination reform.
The front end of inter partes reexamination has been reformed
in only very modest ways."' One of the reforms may be counter-
the PTO has relied upon the "important to a reasonable examiner" standard formerly used
in connection with the Rule 56 duty of disclosure. See Janis, supra note 6, at 47-48 n.
203-06 (citing relevant authority and noting that just as the "reasonable examiner" stan-
dard proved notoriously overinclusive in the Rule 56 context, it has proved overinclusive
in the reexamination context).
29. A series of unfortunate decisions on what it means for a question of patentability
to be "new" in the sense of the reexamination provisions begins with In re Recreative
Technologies Corp., 83 F.3d 1394, 1395 (Fed. Cir. 1996). There, the PTO granted reex-
amination on the basis of eight prior art references that were not of record in the original
prosecution, then rejected the claims based only on a prior art reference that had been of
record during the reexamination. The Federal Circuit held that the reexamination should
have been dismissed at the point where the only prior art references formed the basis for
the rejection were not "new." Id. at 1398. The Federal Circuit extended Recreative
Technologies in In re Portola Packaging, Inc., 110 F.3d 786 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The PTO
based an obviousness rejection in a reexamination on a combination of references. Both
of the references had been of record in the original prosecution, but not combined with
one another to support an obviousness rejection. Id. at 787. The Federal Circuit deemed
the rejection improper in the reexamination because the references were not "new." Id. at
790-91.
The PTO has staunchly resisted the approach laid out in these cases, reading them
extremely narrowly. See Guidelines for Reexamination of Cases in view of In re Portola
Packaging, Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 42 USPQ2d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1997), 64 FED. REG. 15346
(Mar. 31, 1999) (reading Recreative Technologies and Portola as applying only where
rejections in a reexamination are based on references that were actually relied upon to
reject claims in the original prosecution, or were cited and their relevance to patentability
of claims discussed in the original prosecution), superseding Interim Guidelines for Re-
examination of Cases in View of In re Portola Packaging, Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 42 USPQ2d
1295 (Fed. Cir. 1997), 63 Fed. Reg. 32646 (June 15, 1998). The PTO's general approach
appears more consistent with another Federal Circuit panel opinion, In re Hiniker Co.,
150 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that prior art rejections in a reexamination were
properly "new" when they were never before the examiner during original prosecution
and there was evidence that such reference immaterial or was cumulative with any old
art).
30. In the ex parte provisions, if the PTO decides to order reexamination based
upon a third-party's request, the patent owner has the option of filing a patent owner's
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productive: third-party requesters must now identify themselves in
their request documents." While this modification may seem un-
objectionable in the abstract, it does add to the already significant
disincentives to third-party requesters. 2
III. INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION ON THE MERITS
The limitations on the third-party requester's participation in
reexamination during reexamination on the merits33 formed the ba-
sis for most calls to reform of the reexamination system.34 The in-
ter partes reexamination proceeding does, of course, include a new
provision that allows greater third-party participation, specifying
that "[e]ach time that the patent owner files a response to an action
on the merits from the [PTO], the third-party requester shall have
statement pointing out deficiencies in the request and substantial new question of patent-
ability determination, and offering claim amendments or new claims. 35 U.S.C. § 304
(1994). The requester is then entitled to reply. Id. Only thereafter does the PTO actually
initiate reexamination on the merits and issue an official action.
In practice, many patent owners dispensed with the opportunity to file a patent
owner's statement, preferring to divest the requester of the opportunity to reply, and pre-
ferring to await the official action before taking any position on patentability. These con-
siderations presumably induced Congress to dispense with the patent owner's statement
and requester's reply in the inter partes provisions. See 35 U.S.C. § 313 (1999) (provid-
ing that the reexamination order "may be accompanied by the initial action of the Patent
and Trademark Office on the merits of the inter partes reexamination..
31. 35 U.S.C.A. § 311(b)(1) (1999).
32. This change may be thought to serve an anti-harassment function by forcing the
third-party requester into the open. Ironically, though, the requirement may fall hardest
on small players, the very group that deployed the harassment rationale most volubly
during the legislative debate. One can imagine, for example, a small company that fears
an infringement suit from a large patent owner, and would like to test the patent in a rela-
tively inexpensive reexamination forum without attracting attention to the possible in-
fringement. The small company apparently still has the recourse of ex parte reexamina-
tion (because 35 U.S.C. § 302 (1994) does not require identification of the requester's
* identity, and has not been amended), but § 331(b)(1) expressly precludes anonymous re-
quests in interpartes reexaminations.
33. See Janis, supra note 6, at 72 n. 313 (collecting authorities from the regulations,
.MPEP, and Federal Circuit case law for the proposition that active participation by the
* third-party requester in an ex parte reexamination proceeding ends with the filing of a
,reply to the patent owner's statement).
34. Id. at 70, n. 305 (citing the results of an early AIPLA survey in which practitio-
ners expressed frustration with limits on third-party participation in reexaminations); Id.
,at 6, n. 12 (collecting scholarly commentary critical of the provisions restricting third-
.. party participation).
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one opportunity to file written comments addressing the issues
raised by the action of the Office or the patent owner's response
thereto."3 However, unless the PTO formulates carefully crafted
regulations for dealing with inter partes proceedings, it seems
doubtful that a productive adversarial proceeding will result.
There are several reasons for voicing such skepticism. First,
past practice has been to have examiners carry out reexaminations.
It is both unfair and unrealistic to expect examiners who are un-
trained in adversarial proceedings and lacking the authority of the
bench to manage a full-blown adversarial proceeding.
Second, the PTO has not apparently thought carefully about the
conduct of examiner interviews in an inter partes .reexamination
proceeding. Although it is not clear from the face of the new stat-
ute whether a third-party requester has a right to participate in an
examiner interview, PTO regulations promulgated in anticipation
of passage of a previous version of reexamination reform legisla-
tion would have allowed a third-party requester to "participate" in
interviews. 6 Lawyers being lawyers, it seems improbable to ex-
pect that third-party attendees to an interview will simply attend in
silence. Instead, an examiner interview could take on the magni-
tude of a full administrative hearing, yet neither the statute nor
regulations promulgated to date have offered any procedural
guidelines for handling such quasi-hearings. One can easily
imagine examiner interviews in a contested reexamination pro-
ceeding devolving into a fiasco.
Third, it is not clear what limitations inhere in the right to
"comment" in response to issues raised in the patent owner's re-
sponse. Presumably the third-party requester will be entitled to
35. 35 U.S.C.A. § 314(b)(3) (1999). The comments must be filed within 30 days
after the service of the patent owner's response. Id.
36. The PTO's commentary specified that third-party requesters would be permitted
to "attend" interviews, while the actual text of the proposed regulation conferred on third-
party requesters "a right to participate in an interview initiated by the patent owner or the
examiner." See Rules of Practice in Patent Cases; Reexamination Proceedings, 60 FED.
REG. 41,035 1995 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.955(a)) (proposed Aug. 1, 1995), text
reprinted at <http:llwww.uspto.gov/web/offices/comlsollnotices/rexam8O9.html>, visited
March 6, 2000 [hereinafter "1995 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking"] (further specifying
that "a senior level Office official will be present when the interview is attended by a
third-party requester").
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submit expert affidavits (although there will undoubtedly be dis-
putes over whether such evidence is really in the nature of a
"comment" on the "issues raised" as contrasted with evidence
raising new issues). Will the requester be entitled to submit newly-
discovered prior art? Since this seems such a likely possibility, the
PTO should formulate regulations that speak to the matter.
Finally, the inter partes reexamination inexplicably falls short
in one crucial aspect of enhancing third-party participation: the
third-party's opportunity to obtain judicial review of unfavorable
reexamination determinations. Prior versions of the reform legis-
lation envisioned essentially full opportunity for third parties to
seek court review and to participate in patent owner appeals." The
new inter partes provisions actually passed by Congress fail to
give the third-party requester the opportunity to appeal beyond the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences,3" and likewise fail to
37. See, e.g., H.R. 400 (1997), supra note 11, at proposed § 503(e) (proposing
amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 306 (1994)), providing that a third-party requester could ap-
peal "with respect to any final decision in the reexamination proceedings that is favorable
to the patentability of any original or proposed amended or new claim of the patent..
For a discussion of these proposed provisions, see Janis, supra note 6, at 122, n. 326-27.
38. 35 U.S.C. § 134(c) (1994) has been amended to recite that a third-party re-
quester in a reexamination can appeal to the Board, but "[t]he third-party requester may
not appeal the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences." Id. See also
Janis, supra note 6, at 73 n. 326 (analyzing the procedural complexities of third-party re-
quester appeals to the Board).
As to appeal opportunities for the patent owner, the new inter partes legislation gives
the patent owner the right to appeal "any decision adverse to the patentability of any
original or proposed new claim," 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1), and to be a party to a third-party
requester's appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(2). The patent owner's § 315(a)(1) appeal right in
inter partes reexamination is roughly equivalent to the right of appeal that already was
provided in ex parte reexaminations under 35 U.S.C. § 306, although patent owners ap-
pealing under § 315(a)(1) do not have the option of a § 145 suit against the commissioner
in district court. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1) (specifying that patent owners may appeal
under § 134 to the Board and under only §§ 141-44 to the courts); Pub. L. No. 106-113 §
4605(c) (amending § 141 to specify that a patent owner who is dissatisfied with a Board
decision may appeal only to the Federal Circuit). Given the rarity of § 145 actions, this
change seems unlikely to have significant practical impact.
No serious proposal to limit the patent owner's ability to seek judicial review of re-
examination determinations surfaced in the reform process, and such a proposal would
presumably have violated the United States' international obligations under the TRIPs
component of the GATT Agreement in any event. General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, D.O.S. 95-33, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (Annex IC: Trade Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights), Art. 32 ("An opportunity for judicial review of any
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give the third-party requester the opportunity to participate as a
party to a patent owner's appeal beyond the Board of Patent Ap-
peals and Interferences.39
Perhaps the rationale is that third-party requesters could use
court appeals as a delaying tactic, but whatever the rationale, it
seems quite likely that potential third-party requesters will find this
limitation intolerable. Combined with the severe restrictions on
the substantive scope of reexamination 4° and the draconian estoppel
provisions,4' the price to a third-party initiating an inter partes re-
examination will be far too dear in most cases. The restriction on
appeal rights is a major lapse in judgment and could profoundly
undercut the efficacy of the reexamination system.
IV. THE BACK END OF INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION:
REEXAMINATION AND CONCURRENT OR SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION
Relatively early in the reexamination reform process, there
seemed to develop a strong consensus for employing estoppel con-
cepts as the quid pro quo for a third-party's enhanced opportunities
to participate in reexamination. Generally, the estoppel was de-
signed to prevent patent challengers from (1) re-litigating a validity
issue in court following an unsuccessful effort to invalidate
through reexamination, or (2) the reverse, requesting reexamina-
tion following an unsuccessful effort to invalidate in court. Estop-
pel rules along these basic lines appear in the new legislation.42 In
addition, however, Congress has included an over broad estoppel
decision to revoke or forfeit a patent shall be available.").
It appears to be established that the patent owner may not appeal the PTO's initial
determination of the existence of a substantial new question of patentability. See In re
Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (concluding that the Federal Circuit's
jurisdiction to review reexamination determinations extends only to Board determinations
on reexamination on the merits; any errors in the initial determination on the substantial
new question of patentability are "washed clean" by the subsequent Board action on pat-
entability).
39. 35 U.S.C.A. § 315(b)(2) (1999).
40. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 43-65 and accompanying text.
42. 35 U.S.C.A. § 315(c) (1999).
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provision of dubious enforceability and even more questionable
wisdom.
The estoppel provisions make clear that Congress has exacted a
very high price for participation in an inter partes reexamination.
Even without the other disincentives to reexamination (limitations
on substantive scope, appeal restrictions), the estoppel provisions
alone may convince many patent owners to avoid inter partes re-
examination.
A first major estoppel provision of note precludes a third-party
requester in an inter partes reexamination from later asserting in a
civil patent action "the invalidity of any claim finally determined
to be valid and patentable" in the reexamination.43 Estoppel would
be triggered whenever a third-party's request results in an order for
inter partes reexamination.44 This is a substantial change from
previous proposals, under which estoppel would have arisen only if
the third-party requester had filed a notice of appeal to the court or
participated in a patent owner's appeal. 45 In practical effect, it will
of course force potential third-party requesters to decide in ad-
vance of filing a request whether they are willing to live irrevoca-
bly with the patentability determinations that might result from a
reexamination. To be sure, this prevents third parties from engag-
ing in inter partes reexamination up to the point of appeal as a sort
of advance trial run on validity issues. But is there real disadvan-
tage in allowing a "trial run"? Indeed, if the point of reexamina-
tion is to divert validity disputes to administrative proceedings,
wouldn't that point be more admirably served by a mechanism that
encouraged third parties to test out validity theories, on the propo-
sition that this might at least narrow the issues left for later trial, or
encourage settlement, or at least instruct the trial judge?
This estoppel provision, like its previous incarnations of the
,estoppel provision, also has a broad and potentially problematic
sweep, precluding later invalidity assertions to the extent that they
are based "on any ground which the third-party requester raised or
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., H.R. 400 (1997), supra note 11, at § 503(e) (proposing amendments to
35 U.S.C. § 306 (1994)). The new provisions do not give third parties the right of appeal
to the court, and thus can not be use that as the estoppel-triggering event.
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could have raised during the inter partes proceedings." ' The itali-
cized language raises obvious concerns, especially given the ex-
traordinary scope of prior art (even when the prior art is limited to
documentary prior art) upon which a patent challenger might draw
in formulating an invalidity argument.
No doubt responding to these concerns, Congress has injected
compromise language excluding from the scope of the estoppel
"the assertion of invalidity based on newly discovered prior art un-
available to the third-party requester and the Patent and Trademark
Office at the time of the inter partes reexamination proceedings." 47
This language recognizes the problem without going very far to
solve it. Parties will now have to litigate over whether a given
prior art reference was "unavailable" at the time of the reexamina-
tion. It is not clear what this means for documentary prior art, be-
cause inherent in the definition of a prior art "publication" is the
notion of accessibility of the reference to the public. 48 Are not all
prior art publications by definition "available"? And if not meas-
ured by accessibility, how will availability be determined? For ex-
ample, courts might presumably construe the language to refer to
availability after diligent search, but this will only generate further
litigation over the standards of diligence. Moreover, litigating over
the fact of whether a diligent search was performed might require
intrusive discovery in the form of attorney depositions and docu-
ment requests directed towards attorneys' files. It is certainly
ironic that Congress' zeal to prohibit excessive litigation, mani-
fested in its complex estoppel provisions, may actually result in a
quagmire of ancillary litigation over the scope of those very estop-
pel provisions.
The inter partes legislation also contains a mirror image of the
§ 315(c) estoppel provision. Section 317(b) provides that after a,
final judgment of no invalidity is entered in a patent lawsuit, the
46. Id. (emphasis supplied). For predictions that this language will give rise to'
abundant litigation, see Janis, supra note 6, at 86.
47. 35 U.S.C.A. § 315(c) (1999).
48. See, e.g., In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (articulating the accessibility
standard as the "touchstone" for determining whether a reference qualifies as a "printed
publication").
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patent challenger 9 is estopped from requesting inter partes reex-
amination'° of the patent claims at issue in the lawsuit on any
grounds that the challenger raised or could have raised in the law-
suit.,,
A second major estoppel provision raises even thornier prob-
lems. Section 4607 of the bill provides that "[Any party" who re-
quests inter partes reexamination52 will be estopped from later
challenging, in any civil action, "any fact determined during the
process of such reexamination... ." This veritable blunderbuss
of an estoppel provision is both bad policy and bad law, and de-
serves swiftly to be escorted out of the statute:
It is worth speculating on the types of factual determinations
that might be targeted by this provision, given that the PTO would
theoretically only be analyzing validity over the documentary prior
art, and the statute already contains an estoppel provision against
validity challenges. In the course of analyzing validity over the
documentary prior art, the PTO may well make factual determina-
tions that could be argued later to bear on a number of other issues:
validity over the non-documentary prior art; materiality (for ineq-
uitable conduct); any of the section 112, first paragraph challenges;
49. More particularly, the patent challenger and its "privies." 35 U.S.C.A. § 317(b)
(1999). See infra note 60 concerning the extension of estoppel effects to a party's "priv-
ies."
50. Surprisingly, this would appear to leave the way open for a subsequent request
for ex parte reexamination.
51. Accordingly, this provision also contains the troublesome "raised or could have
raised" language. It appears that Congress may also have intended to incorporate the ex-
ception for newly discovered prior art unavailable to the patent challenger as of the time
of the lawsuit. If so, 35 USC § 317(b) contains a drafting error: the exception as drafted
refers only to prior art unavailable as of the time of a prior reexamination proceeding (a
separate topic also covered in 35 USC § 317(b)).
52. Presumably, patent owners will rarely, if ever, request inter partes reexamina-
tion, so the estoppel provision is primarily directed towards third-party requesters not-
withstanding the phrase "any party."
53. Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4607. The provision includes an exception for any fac-
tual determination "later proved to be erroneous based on information unavailable at the
time of the inter partes reexamination decision." Whether this language is intended to
invoke by analogy the "clearly erroneous" standard of review is open to question.
, 54. Congress apparently had misgivings of its own, reflected on the face of the pro-
vision itself. Id. ("If this section is held to be unenforceable, the enforceability of the re-
mainder of this subtitle or of this title shall not be denied as a result.")
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the scope of equivalents in a means-plus-function limitation; or
(less likely, perhaps, but conceivable) infringement issues.
As a policy matter, it is blatantly a case of piling on, skewing
inter partes reexamination even further against third parties.55
From a broader perspective, it makes little sense to limit the scope
of reexamination to validity issues concerning documentary prior
art on the one hand, and then to vest the PTO's factual determina-
tions with such vast preclusive effect on the other. Indeed, to the
extent that the provision does purport to give preclusive effect to.
fact determinations relevant to infringement, it is difficult to see
how the provision squares with the Seventh Amendment jury trial
guarantee.
Yet another estoppel provision concerns the practice of filing
serial reexamination proceedings. Section 317(b)57 provides that if
a third-party requester loses an inter partes reexamination (mean-
ing that "a final decision in an inter partes reexamination proceed-
ing instituted by a third-party requester is favorable to the patent-
ability of any original or proposed amended or new claim of the
patent"), 8 the requester" is estopped from thereafter requesting an-
55. Those who protested most loudly against reexamination reform on the grounds
that it would allow third parties to harass patentees would presumably assert that an anti-
harassment rationale undergirds the estoppel provision. One cannot but agree; making
the reexamination system so manifestly unattractive that no sensible third-party would
ever initiate a proceeding is certainly one way to deal with harassment concerns. It is.
hardly an attractive one, however.
56. See Winans v. Denmead, 56 US (15 How.) 330, 338 (1853) (characterizing the
determination of whether infringement occurred as "a question of fact, to be submitted to
a jury"), cited in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 US 370, 382 (1996).
More fundamentally, the inter partes reexamination scheme is likely to draw a due
process challenge, as well as a Seventh Amendment challenge on the grounds that it de-
prives a patent owner of a jury trial on validity issues. Whether a patent owner has a
right to a jury trial on validity has not been definitively resolved. For a brief analysis of
the Seventh Amendment implications of inter partes reexamination, and a discussion of
the fate of Seventh Amendment challenges to ex parte reexamination, see supra text ac.
companying note 6, at 87-92.
57. 35 U.S.C.A. §317(b) (1999).
58. Id.
59. Actually, the requester "or his privies." Id. The PTO will have its hands full
determining who qualifies as a "privy" for purposes of this provision, a determination
that would seem to involve evidence that the PTO is not well equipped to receive, or, for
that matter, to comprehend. Nonetheless, the same language appeared in prior legislative,
proposals, see H.R. 400, 105"b Cong. (1997), supra note 11, at proposed §503(0 (proL
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other inter partes reexamination 6° on the previously reexamined
claims on issues that were raised or could have been raised 61 in the
previous reexamination.
In three other respects concerning the impact of reexamination
on concurrent infringement litigation, the inter partes legislation
appears to leave unchanged the rules and practices that have devel-
oped for ex parte reexamination. First, the new legislation surely
leaves intact the rule that statements appearing in the prosecution
history of an inter partes reexamination can be used in subsequent
litigation for claim construction and potentially as a source of
prosecution history estoppel.62
Second, the inter partes reexamination provisions retain the
rule that substantive claim amendments during reexamination op-
erate to cut off any infringement damages accruing prior to the is-
suance of the reexamination certificate.63 This, at least, preserves
one of the few genuine incentives for a third-party to have validity
adjudicated in reexamination rather than in litigation.
Third, the new legislation includes what appears to be an en-
tirely unnecessary provision authorizing District Courts to stay liti-
gation pending the outcome of an inter partes reexamination. 64 It
posed new section 308), and the PTO promulgated tentative regulations designed to ad-
dress the question. See Rules of Practice in Patent Cases; Reexamination Proceedings,
supra note 37 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.997).
60. That is, requesting another inter partes reexamination or continuing an ongoing
inter partes reexamination. Id.
61. See supra text accompanying note 52 for comments on the pitfalls of the "raised
or could have been raised" language.
62. See, e.g., J.T. Eaton & Co. v. At. Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1570-
71.(Fed. Cir. 1997) (using reexamination prosecution history in the course of claim con-
struction).
.- 63. In the exparte reexamination provisions, see 35 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1994). In the
interpartes provisions, see 35 U.S.C.A. § 316(b) (1999). For recent cases interpreting §
307(b), see, e.g., Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 163 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(concluding that the patentee had made substantive changes to claim scope in a reexami-
nation, thus triggering the damages limitation in § 307(b)); See also Bloom Eng'g Co. v.
North Am. Mfg. Co., 129 F.3d 1247, 1249-51 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (discussing relevant stan-
dards and concluding that patentee's claim amendments made a substantive change).
.64. 35 U.S.C. § 318 (1999). The provision declares that a patent owner "may" ob-
tain a stay, "unless the court before which such litigation is pending determines that a
stay would not serve the interests of justice."
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was already clear from existing case law,65 and from notions of the
court's inherent authority to control its own docket, that courts
have discretion to grant or deny stays pending reexamination.
There is no indication that the express statutory authorization of
stays in the context of inter partes reexamination is intended to
diminish courts' authority to grant stays pending ex parte reexami-
nation, and it would be unfortunate if courts were to leap to the
conclusion that Congressional silence was deliberately directed
towards discouraging stays pending exparte reexamination.
CONCLUSION
To put it pointedly, inter partes reexamination is a dog. Its
substantive scope is too narrow, its procedural assurances of
meaningful third-party participation are questionable, its appeal
provisions are too limited, and its estoppel provisions are exces-
sive. It is the conclusion of a well-intentioned, but conceptually
incongruous legislative exercise: Congress began with a statue that
was designed to enable the PTO to correct a limited range of its er-
rors, and attempted to transform it into an administrative revoca-
tion scheme that could serve as an alternative to litigation, without
making fundamental alterations. What resulted is a proceeding
that is likely to confuse and annoy its participants, few though they
may be.
This is not to suggest that the reexamination "reform" process
has been entirely devoid of positive outcomes. That the legislation
actually passed may in itself constitute a remarkable feat irrespec-
tive of its content. The move towards inter partes proceedings,
tentative and muddled though it may be, is at least a symbolic step
in the right direction. Additionally, the bifurcated structure of the
new legislative scheme may make more feasible an evaluation of
the inter partes procedures independent from the ex parte proce-
dures. 66
Congress has signaled its commitment to revisit reexamination
65. See, supra text accompanying note 6, at 78-81.
66. See supra note 14; see also American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L.
No. 106-113 (codified as amended at U.S.C. §§ 311-318 (1999)).
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in five years,67 by which time it should be clear that the new legis-
lation is not channeling any significant number of disputes away
from the courts. Some will no doubt conclude that the concept of
inter partes administrative patent revocation is a failure and should
be abandoned altogether. A correct conclusion would be that Con-
gress has so hamstrung the system that it was preordained to fail,
where a more carefully designed administrative revocation scheme
might well succeed.
At the very least, Congress has introduced the conceptual basis
for separating ex parte reexamination from inter partes proceed-
ings. Perhaps the next legislative incarnation of reexamination will
be more boldly constructed. Indeed, perhaps it will not be reex-
amination at all.
1 67. See supra note 14.
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